On November the 26th 1939,
tensions were high with all the negotiations between the Soviet Union
and Finland and the mobilisation of the military on both sides. Near
the Village of Mainila, on the boarder between the two countries,
three Finnish Observation posts and several other Boarder Guards on
patrol heard and witnessed 7 shells, and there subsequent
denotations, within Soviet territory. Within hours of this incident,
the Finnish delegation was informed by Soviet Authorities that due to
Finnish Aggression that the Non-aggression pact that was signed in
1932 and also in 1934 were null and void and all diplomatic avenues
between the countries were to cease. The incident was possible
inspired by the Gleiwitz incident that had taken place earlier that
year, this was used by the Third Reich as an excuse for it to
withdraw from its non-aggression pact with Poland.
Why did this False Flag incident
happen?
The Soviet Union had been negotiating
with Finland for several bits of territory in an attempt to expand
its influence. It had succeeded in incorporating several other Baltic
states using a similar tactic and thought Finland would be its next
victim. However Finland refused the Soviet Union in its demands for
the Finnish Border to be pulled back 25 miles from its current
position which would mean it would lose its defences on the Karelian
Isthmus, the lensing of the peninsula of Hanko which would be the
site of a Naval Base for the Baltic Fleet and in conjunction with
Coastal Artillery in Estonian would effectively seal of the Gulf of
Finland, as well as other demands. In return Finland would receive
3,450 square miles of Soviet Karelia but the exchange was not
advantageous to Finland. Finland gave two counter offers,
respectively on 23 October and 3 November and would mean the cedeing
of only Terijoki to the USSR. These were flatly refused and the
Finnish delegation in Moscow returned to Finland on the 13th
November, hoping the negotiations would continue.
The Set-up
It was a Sunday afternoon and Finnish
Border Guards did what they normally did, patrolled the border,
played cards, listened to the radio, chatted about things back home
mainly of the female variety and maintained their weapons. All knew
about the recent negotiations and how high the tension was (from the
9th of October the Finnish Army had been slowly mobilised
under the guise of refresher training), they also knew they were be
the first line of defence against the tidal wave of the Red Army. At
about 1440 the Border Guards heard 7 successive artillery shots being
fired, soon it was worked out that the shots hand landed 800 meters
behind the border and that the weapon used was a high trajectory
Trench Mortar. The Guards thought it was training exercise and
recorded a smoke screen going up soon after the shots, which thus
blocked all observation. Three Guards saw a officer on Horseback
approach their Russian counterparts who were standing about the
nearest building in Mainila, soon all 12 men marched off in an
easterly direction and within ten minutes 7 shells landed on that
very same spot. The guards also reported six men coming back to
inspect the damage and saw no sign of dead or injured people.
At 2100 Moscow Time (2200 in Helsinki)
Baron Yrjö-Koskinen
received a call asking him to report to the Kremlin. He was informed
by Molotov that Soviet Border Guards stationed at Mainila had been
fired upon resulting in the deaths of three privates and one NCO, two
officers and seven privates were also wounded. The Finnish Government
attempted to deal with this incident in the diplomatic way and
drafted a letter which stated that the shots had come from the
Russian side of the border and that to put in place protocols
relating to border incidents that were part of the 1932
non-aggression Pact (which was extended in 1934) and that both sides
should withdraw their forces to the same distances. It was impossible
for Finnish Artillery to have fired the shots because on the orders
of Field Marshal Mannerheim, all Finnish guns were withdrawn from
range of the border for several weeks before the shots were fired.
The Soviet government was
unwilling to accept such an answer stating that “the deep hostility
of the Finnish government towards the Soviet Union” was forcing the
tensions to boiling point and “The fact that the Finnish government
denies that Finnish forces fired upon Soviet forces with artillery
and inflicted casualties, can only be explained as a device to
mislead public opinion”, and so Molotov informed the small Republic
of Finland that the Soviet government was no longer bound by the
non-aggression pact. Within four days of this announcement Helsinki
was on fire from Soviet Bombs and troops had crossed the border in
several locations.
Repercussion
When the Soviet
Union collapsed in 1991 hundreds of documents were declassified and
Russian Historian Pavel Aptekar analysed the dairies and reports of
the units who were posted in the area and found no record of any
losses on the day of the 26th
or in the immediate dates surrounding it. Nikita Khrushchev (who at
the time was a Commissar and served as an intermediary between Stalin
and the Generals of the Red Army) claimed in his memoirs that the
incident was set up by Marshal of Artillery Grigory Kulik, an
infamous NKVD General who would contribute to the failure of the
Soviet defence during the first weeks of the German invasion. However
he very coy about who fired the first shots and is quoted as saying
“It's always like that when people start a war. They say, 'You
fired the first shot,' or 'You slapped me first and I'm only hitting
back.' There was once a ritual which you sometimes see in opera:
someone throws down a glove to challenge someone else to a duel; if
the glove is picked up, that means the challenge is accepted. Perhaps
that's how it was done in the old days, but in our time it's not
always so clear who starts a war.” Boris Yeltsin, the First
President of the Russian Federation (which followed the Soviet Union)
made a statement in 1994 denouncing the Winter War as a War of
Aggression.
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